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Abstract: An econometric study of all felony cases filed in Denver, Colorado, in 
2002, shows that public defenders achieved poorer outcomes than their privately 
retained counterparts, measured by the actual sentences defendants received.  But 
this study suggests that the traditional explanation for this difference—under-
funding resulting in overburdened public defenders—may not tell the whole 
story.  The authors discovered a large segment of what they call “marginally 
indigent” defendants, who appear capable of hiring private counsel if the charges 
against them are sufficiently serious. When the sentence data was controlled for 
the seriousness of the charges, however, public defenders still performed more 
poorly than private counsel.  These results suggest that at least one explanation 
for poor public defender outcomes may be that public defender clients, by self 
selection, tend to have less defensible cases.  If marginally indigent defendants 
can find the money to hire private counsel when the charges are sufficiently 
serious, perhaps they can also find the money when they are innocent, or think 
they have a strong case.
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2AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF PUBLIC DEFENDER EFFECTIVENESS: 
SELF-SELECTION BY THE “MARGINALLY INDIGENT”
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1963 the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent 
state court criminal defendants the right to court-appointed trial counsel at state expense.1
That right became institutionalized in many states by the creation of public defender 
systems,2 and the effectiveness of those systems has been the object of great debate.  
Much of that debate has taken the form of empirical studies comparing in some fashion 
the “effectiveness” of public defenders and private criminal defense lawyers, with mixed 
results.  Most, but not all, early studies showed that public defenders were just as 
effective as their private counterparts, despite the obvious disadvantages of under-
funding and economic disincentives.3 But after 1980 many, but not all, studies began to 
1
 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  Several states, by constitution, statute or case law, 
recognized the right of indigent criminal defendants to court-appointed trial counsel at state expense long 
before Gideon.  Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 469-70 (1942).  Gideon simply nationalized these views by 
holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied to the states by incorporation through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
2
 Public defender systems also pre-dated Gideon.  The nation’s first appears to have been created in Los 
Angeles in 1913, followed by New York City in 1917.  Ellery E. Cuff, Public Defender System: The Los 
Angeles Story, 45 MINN. L. REV. 715, 721, 727-28 (1961); Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, 
Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581 (1986-87).  
Today, roughly one-third of the states have statewide public defender systems, although there are many 
others within which regional or local public defender systems operate.  Even in those states that are “pure” 
appointment states, many have statewide standards that govern the appointment and payment of private 
counsel.  Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Toward a More Effective Right to Assistance of 
Counsel: Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 31, 37 (1995).
3
 For a comprehensive review of the early studies, see Floyd Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson, Public 
Defenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained Counsel: Does the Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Matter?, 22 
RUTGERS L.J. 361, 365-78 (1991).  Interestingly, one of those early studies was of felony cases filed in 
Denver, though, as discussed in the text accompanying notes 5 to 11 supra, this study, like most studies, did 
not look at actual sentence outcomes.  Jean G. Taylor, et al., An Analysis of Defense Counsel for the 
Processing of Felony Defendants in Denver, Colorado, 50 DEN. L. J. 9, tbl. 15 (1973) (measuring types of 
sentences, not lengths of sentences).
3demonstrate just the opposite: that private counsel were substantially more effective than 
public defenders.4
The most startling thing about these studies is not that they reached different 
results, but rather that almost none of them measured actual sentence outcomes.  Instead, 
they compared things like how soon the defense lawyer first met the client,5 the time 
from filing to disposition,6 the number of defense motions filed,7 plea bargaining rates8
and conviction rates.9 A few studies looked at dismissal rates and/or the number of times 
defense counsel achieved a sentence reduction, but without quantifying that reduction.10
But of course what criminal defendants care most about, and therefore what effectiveness 
researchers should measure, is not how long a case takes to get resolved (though 
defendants who cannot make bail care about that) or whether the case is plea bargained or 
4
 See, e.g., Dean J. Champion, Private Counsels and Public Defenders: A Look at Weak Cases, Prior 
Records and Leniency in Bargaining, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 253 (1989) (finding that private counsel enjoy a 
higher trial rate and a lower conviction rate than public defenders); Joyce S. Sterling, Retained Counsel 
Versus the Public Defender: The Impact of Type of Counsel on Charge Bargaining, in THE DEFENSE 
COUNSEL 151, 160-62 (W. McDonald, ed. 1983) (finding that private counsel are more likely to obtain 
deferred dispositions and charge reductions than public defenders).  
5
  See, e.g., Smith & DeFrances, supra note 8, tbl. 7 (reporting that 69% of private-pay clients saw their 
lawyer within a week after arrest, compared to 47% of indigent clients).  
6
 See, e.,g., Roger A. Hanson, et al., National Ctr. For State Courts, Indigent Defenders Get the Job Done 
and Done Well 43-44 (1992) (reporting a 160-day delay for private-pay clients and a 103-day delay for 
indigent clients).  
7
 See, e.g., McConville & Mirsky, supra note 2 (summarizing data showing New York City public 
defenders and court appointed counsel engaged in substantially less motions practice than private counsel). 
8
 See, e.g., Hanson et al., supra note 6, tbl. 11 (finding that public defenders plea bargain 95% of their 
cases, court-appointed counsel plea bargain 94% of theirs and private counsel plea bargain 91% of theirs).   
9
 See, e.g., id. at tbl. 12 (finding that public defenders suffer an 88% conviction rate, court-appointed 
counsel 83% and private counsel 88%).
10
  See, e.g., Hanson et al., supra note 6, tbl. 8 (finding that public defenders got 9% of their cases 
dismissed, court-appointed counsel 9% and private counsel 13%), and tbl. 10 (finding that public defenders 
achieved some reduction in charge in 86% of their cases, court-appointed counsel in 87% and private 
counsel in 84%).
4goes to trial (though private-pay clients care about that) or even what the dismissal rate is 
(since, as we show below, very few cases are dismissed).  What criminal defendants care 
most about, and therefore what researchers looking into whether public defenders are as 
effective as private lawyers should care most about, is the actual outcome of the case—
for how long, if at all, was the defendant sentenced to incarceration?
Yet there have been only a handful of studies that looked at actual sentence 
outcomes, and none of them, to our knowledge, used the regression techniques we use to 
control for things like the seriousness of the charges.11 Moreover, several of them claim 
to be sentence outcome studies, but look only at types of sentences and not length,12 or 
only at defendants who actually received prison sentences (thus ignoring effectiveness 
differences in other kinds of sentences, such as jail time given with probation).13 In this 
study, we examine actual sentence outcomes for all charged defendants, regardless of the 
type of sentence imposed.
Some of the observed differences in previous studies can be explained by 
spending patterns.  In general, public defender spending, on a per client basis, shrank 
rather dramatically after 1980. For the nine years between 1970 and 1978, total state and 
11
 See the studies comprehensively discussed in Feeney & Jackson, supra note 3.  It is not clear why there 
have been so few studies of actual sentence outcomes.  One explanation may be that outcome data was not 
available in electronic form until relatively recently, and even then researchers face confidentiality barriers 
that prevent unrestricted access to all the data.  See text accompanying note 43 infra.  Another explanation 
may be that the econometric techniques we use in this study are relatively new, and even when they became 
standard methods in economics, they were not accessible to most legally-trained academics.
12
 See the 1973 Denver study discussed in note 3 supra.  
13
 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Indigent Defense Statistics (1999).  This study 
found that publicly-financed defense lawyers (combining public defenders and appointed counsel) were 
slightly more effective than privately retained counsel, but its outcome results were limited to cases in 
which the defendant received some incarceration.  Because it also found that indigent defendants suffered a 
substantially higher rate of incarceration, one cannot tell from the reported data whether, if one includes all 
cases, publicly financed lawyers did better or worse than private lawyers.  
5local spending on indigent defendants increased almost seven-fold (though admittedly 
from a low baseline), from $46 million to $315 million (in constant dollars).14 For the 12 
years from 1979 through 1990 spending merely doubled.15
In the meantime, at the very point in 1980 when spending was decelerating, the 
number of indigent defendants exploded.  First, the total number of criminal case filings 
increased dramatically, more than doubling between 1980 and 1990.16   Second, more of 
these defendants were indigent and relied on public counsel.  Until the 1980s, the 
percentage of indigent defendants nationwide had always hovered under 50%.  For 
example, in 1962, one year before Gideon, the indigency rate was 43%.17   In 1980, 
seventeen years after Gideon, it was still only 48%.  But by 1992 it was 80%.18
The net effect of these patterns is that spending in constant dollars per indigent 
defendant began to decrease rapidly in the early 1980s.  But these spending realities do 
not completely solve the effectiveness puzzle.  In the first place, these are total spending 
figures, and do not control for variations across jurisdictions.  The spending variance 
between particular jurisdictions is substantial.  For example, in FY 2002, Colorado and 
14
 Compare Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook on Criminal Justice—1973, tbl. 
1.2 (1973) with Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook on Criminal Justice—1980, 
tbl. 1.4 (1980).     
15
 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, National Criminal Defense Systems Study 33 (1986).
16
 Compare National Ctr. For State Courts, State Court Caseload Statistics: Annual Report 1984,  tbl. 35 
(1986) (showing a 36% increase in state criminal filings between 1978 and 1984) with National Ctr. For 
State Courts, State Court Caseload Statistics: Annual Report 1991, tbl. 1.25 (1993) (showing a 51% 
increase between 1985 and 1991). 
17
 Lee Silverstein, THE DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS: A FIELD 
STUDY AND REPORT 7-8 (1965).
18
 Steven K. Smith & Carol J. DeFrances, Indigent Defense, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Selected Findings
at 4 (February 1996).
6Kentucky, which had roughly equal populations, spent $40 million and $28 million, 
respectively, on their public defender programs.19
Moreover, as late as 2001, in a study covering 11 different U.S. cities in eight 
different states, researchers claimed results that showed public defenders were 
performing just as effectively as private lawyers.20  Thus, even after the budget crises of 
the 1980s, and quite apart from cross-jurisdictional budgetary differences, the overall 
results of public defender effectiveness studies remain mixed and quite unenlightening.21
It is important to recognize that all measures of effectiveness—even sentence 
outcomes—may have built-in biases that cut against public defenders, including the 
possibility that public defender clients may tend to be in custody rather than on bond 
(putting substantially more pressure on them to plea bargain) and that public defender 
clients may tend to have more prior felonies (subjecting them to greater penalties if 
convicted). Although our statistical techniques could in theory control for these 
variables, the data available to us did not allow us to do so.22 These potential biases 
require us to be cautious in the conclusions we draw from any study of public defender 
effectiveness. Nevertheless, observers continue to examine public defender 
19
 The Spangenberg Group, State and County Expenditures for Indigent Defense Services in Fiscal Year 
2002 (September 2003).
20
 Roger A. Hanson, Brian J. Ostrom, & Ann M. Jones, Effective Adversaries for the Poor in THE 
ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN  (M. Feeley & S. Miyazawa, eds. 2001).
21
 We recognize that each public defender system not only has its own funding levels, but its own 
organizational structure, caseloads and legal culture.  It is therefore fair to ask what we really learn if public 
defenders in New York are less effective than private counsel in New York, but public defenders in Los 
Angeles are more effective that private counsel in Los Angeles.
22
 The electronic form of our data did not contain information about defendants’ bail status or their prior 
felony record.  See text accompanying notes 43 to 44 infra.  
7effectiveness, researchers continue to find contradictory results (though only a few look 
at actual sentence outcomes), and policy makers want to know what it all means.
In 1997, William Stuntz, then at Virginia and now at Harvard, added a new and 
important voice to the controversy.  In an article in the Yale Law Journal entitled “The 
Uneasy Relationship between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice,”23 Professor 
Stuntz approached the question of public defender effectiveness not in isolation, but as 
one piece of the larger system of criminal justice.  Stuntz suggested that, because of the 
interdependence of overburdened prosecutors and overburdened public defenders, the 
whole mechanism of criminal procedure—designed generally to protect criminal 
defendants—could be having the unintended consequence of disadvantaging indigent 
defendants, because their public defenders cannot afford to litigate time-consuming pre-
trial motions as frequently as private counsel.
More broadly, Stuntz proposed that all the parts of the criminal justice system 
enjoy a rough kind of equilibrium, so that increased demands placed on the system at one 
point will be compensated for at other points.  So, for example, as the Warren Court 
began to constitutionalize various aspects of criminal procedure, state legislatures 
responded by tightening the appropriations for court-appointed counsel.24  Purse strings 
are not the only counterbalance to what legislatures may deem overly protective 
judicially-created criminal procedures.  Stuntz also discussed other kinds of legislative 
reactions, including criminalizing more behaviors and increasing penalties.  As he 
summarized his observations: 
23
  107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).
24
 Id. at 54-65. 
8[G]iven the existing allocation of power between courts and legislatures, 
our system suffers from a natural tendency toward a series of 
pathologies—overregulation of the criminal process, proceduralization of 
criminal litigation at the expense of the merits, overcriminalization, and 
underfunding of criminal defense . . . .   [T]hese pathologies tend to 
reinforce one another.25
If we return to the narrower problem of public defender effectiveness, the Stuntz 
syllogism on this point is rather simple: 1) overworked public defenders file fewer 
potentially time-consuming pre-trial motions than private counsel; 2) overworked 
prosecutors, faced with two otherwise identical cases—one with lots of potentially time-
consuming motions and one with fewer such motions—and the time to try only one of 
them, will plea bargain the one with the more motions; and 3) private counsel thus tend to 
enjoy more favorable plea bargains than their public defender counterparts.  In a system 
that has a national plea-bargaining rate of 95%,26 this difference in treatment could be 
devastating to indigent defendants.
Notice that this is not just a fancied-up version of the “public defenders are 
overburdened” explanations offered by earlier scholars, though it certainly depends on 
the assumption that public defenders (and prosecutors, for that matter) are overworked 
compared to private counsel.  It is a profoundly disturbing commentary on the whole 
relationship between procedure and justice.  Procedures designed expressly to protect the 
25
 Id. at 65. 
26
 See Matthew R. Durose et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Felony Sentencing in State Courts, 1998, tbl. 9-10 
(NCJ 190103) (Oct. 2001) (94% of state felony cases are plea bargained); U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 2001 
Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, fig. C (2001) (96.6% of federal felony cases are plea 
bargained). 
9accused—often deemed so fundamental as to have become constitutionalized27—may be 
having the effect of dividing defendants into the procedural haves and the procedural 
have-nots, with serious substantive consequences.28
Notice also that Stuntz does not attribute this difference in outcomes to some 
qualitative and unmeasurable difference in the two kinds of lawyers’ skill at the motions, 
trial or sentencing stages.  Instead, he suggests that the difference is expressed at the very 
heart of the system—at the plea bargaining stage—and that it is not necessarily the result 
of public defenders being less skilled bargainers than private lawyers. On the contrary, 
under Stuntz’s hypothesis, overworked public defenders are being forced to accept less 
favorable bargains because those are the bargains overworked prosecutors are offering.
Stuntz argues, quite powerfully, that if his general hypothesis is true, indigent 
defendants—especially innocent indigent defendants cajoled into pleading guilty by the 
27
 As Stuntz recognized, the judicial regulation of police, primarily under the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, represents only a portion of the vast constitutionalization of criminal procedure.  Serpentine 
constitutionally-driven rules govern virtually every aspect of the criminal process, from the selection of 
grand and petit jurors under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), through application of the 
confrontation clause at trial under Crawford v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), and 
even at sentencing under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and now Blakely v. Washington, 
___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).    
28 Another disturbing observation that Stuntz makes is that because procedural litigation is less costly than 
merits litigation—or, more precisely, because preliminary investigation of a procedural defense (e.g., did 
the interrogating officer Mirandize the defendant) is typically much less costly than preliminary 
investigation of a substantive defense (e.g., did the defendant have an alibi)—defense counsel will have 
significant incentives to litigate often non-dispositive procedural issues to the exclusion of dispositive 
substantive ones.  Id. at 37-41.  But of course because 95% of criminal cases are plea bargained, what 
drives most outcomes is not the actual results of procedural or merits litigation but rather counsel’s guesses 
about those outcomes.  But the effect is the same: if counsel’s attention to difficult merits issues gets 
displaced in some cases by their attention to less difficult procedural issues, that displacement will likewise 
be reflected in the plea bargain.  That is, a defense lawyer with a good suppression issue will use the 
strength of that issue to bargain for a favorable offer, and at the margins the time and energy used in that 
bargaining may displace the time and energy that could have been used to establish the client’s outright 
innocence.  But see the text accompanying note 71 infra for criticisms of these arguments.   
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considerable weight of the plea bargaining machine—would be substantially better off in 
a system with no procedural protections at all.29
Stuntz’s article triggered a wave of commentary, both positive and negative.30
Surprisingly, the one thing it did not trigger was any kind of empirical effort to test its 
validity.  We decided to undertake such an effort, and in the process to re-ask the basic 
effectiveness question, but this time by looking at actual sentence outcomes in a 
comprehensive econometric fashion.
We tested Stuntz’s hypothesis by examining sentence outcomes in thousands of 
cases.  Our data consisted of every felony case filed in Denver, Colorado, in calendar 
year 2002.  There were 5,224 felony cases filed in Denver in 2002; we were able to 
examine outcome data for 3,777 cases.31 We used regression analyses to measure the 
effect that the type of defense lawyer has on sentence outcomes and on the number of 
procedural motions filed. Regression analysis enabled us to separate the effects of many 
different factors on our measures of these two variables , and thus to measure the impact 
29
 Stuntz, supra note 23, at 47-48.  This argument about unintended procedural consequences surfaces in 
many different criminal contexts.  For example, there is a whole line of Miranda criticisms arguing that 
rather than protecting suspects from police overreaching, Miranda actually gives police the green light to 
overreach once they have gone through the arguably meaningless safe harbor of the warnings.  See, e.g., 
Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda’s Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
1084 (1996); William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Irrelevance, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975 (2001); George C. Thomas 
III, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091 (2003).  
30
 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Real-World Shift in Criminal Procedure, 93 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 789, 790-91 (2003); Daryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. 
REV. 323, 327-28 (2004); Richard E. Frase. Book Review: The Search for the Whole Truth About American 
and European Criminal Justice, 3 BUFF. CRIM L.J. 785, 792-93 (2000); Louis Michael Seidman, Book 
Review: Akhil Amar and the (Premature) Demise of Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281, 
2313 (1998); Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX. L.  REV. 
1057, n. 6 (2002).  As of July 26, 2004, a Westlaw search disclosed that Stuntz’s article had been cited 138 
times.
31
 We discuss why only 3,777 cases had measurable outcomes in the text accompanying notes 61 to 63 
infra.
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of the variables while controlling for other factors that may affect case outcomes.  
Specifically, we controlled for the seriousness of the charges against the defendant, 
whether the case went to trial, and the number of counts filed against the defendant. We 
also performed regressions with different combinations of controls to ensure that our 
results were not sensitive to the variables included in the regressions.
What we found was quite surprising. Denver public defenders achieved worse 
sentence outcomes for their clients than private defense counsel, just as Stuntz predicted, 
but not for the reason Stuntz suggested—that is, not because private counsel file more 
procedural motions.  On the contrary, we found that public defenders filed marginally 
more motions than private counsel.32
We also discovered that there is a surprisingly large segment of defendants who 
tend to use the public defender when the charges against them are not serious, but 
manage to retain private counsel when they are faced with serious charges.  We call these 
defendants “marginally indigent.” Their existence arguably skews the effectiveness 
results against public defenders, because, if private counsel on average handle more 
serious cases than public defenders, private counsel have more room to be “effective” in 
the sentences they achieve.  So we re-calibrated the data controlling for the seriousness of 
the felony, but the results remained the same: public defenders still achieved worse 
outcomes than private counsel.  
32
 The first of these results was quite surprising to the judge-author of this article, who has presided over 
many cases with both public defenders and private defense lawyers, and, if forced to guess, would have 
predicted that public defenders are more effective than private lawyers.  On reflection, this feeling may 
have been the product of experiencing public defenders at trial, and, as shown in Figure 2 and as discussed 
in the text accompanying notes 64 to 65 infra, our data shows public defenders are just as effective as 
private lawyers at trial.  The judge-author was not surprised that public defenders file more motions than 
private lawyers, as discussed in the text accompanying note 71 infra.
12
These results suggest a non-traditional explanation for reduced public defender 
effectiveness: perhaps some public defender clients have been self-selected for guilt.  If 
you are a marginally-indigent defendant, and you know not only that you are guilty but 
also that there is a very high probability that you will be convicted (for example, your 
crime was captured on videotape), it is not unreasonable to imagine that you will be less 
inclined to scrape together the money for private counsel than if, for example, you know 
you are wrongly accused.  Thus, public defenders’ lower effectiveness may simply reflect 
the fact that, on average, they represent defendants with worse cases.33
II. METHODOLOGY
A.  General
Any empirical study of criminal litigation must deal with the twin challenges that 
almost all criminal cases are plea bargained,34 and that plea bargains are negotiated by the 
lawyers privately, with no participation by the trial court, and therefore no plea 
bargaining record (other than the ultimate outcome) from which data might be 
retrieved.35 As a result, studies of plea bargaining generally fall into three categories: 
post-bargain interviews of counsel; mock plea bargaining sessions; and analyses of actual 
cases, with this later category, as discussed above, using various ways of measuring 
33
 All of our raw data is available in electronic form from the offices of the ** Law Review.
34
 See note 26 supra.
35
 In fact, in federal court and most state courts, including Colorado, the rules of criminal procedure 
expressly forbid the trial court from participating in the plea negotiations.  F. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1); COLO. 
CRIM. P. 11(f)(4). 
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effectiveness.36
The two former methods have the advantage of being directed at the heart of the 
plea bargain exchange between the defense lawyer and the prosecutor, but of course they 
suffer from the disadvantages of being very expensive, artificial and somewhat 
subjective.  The approach of examining actual case outcomes has the advantage of 
dealing with real cases in an objective manner, but must somehow be able to take into 
account the innumerable variables that go into the plea bargain, and must also be able to 
construct inferences from the outcomes back to the plea bargain.  Outcome studies are 
also considerably cheaper, especially if the data is stored electronically, and manual 
examinations of individual case files can thus be avoided.  Such studies can also examine 
much larger amounts of data than the other two methods. 
Here, because we are not interested in lawyer “effectiveness” in any absolute 
sense, but instead only in the differences between groups of lawyers, many of the 
confounding variables that present themselves in outcome studies cancel out, or, more 
precisely, get shuttled into the overall effectiveness measure. For example, the 
differences within one group—say, the differences in experience between one public 
defender and another public defender—will get blended together in our measure of 
aggregate public defender effectiveness.37 Some variables that would be complicating in 
36
 See text accompanying notes 5 to 13 supra. 
37
 That is, among the traditional disadvantages from which public defenders may suffer, we might add a 
lack of experience, as compared to private lawyers.  We did not measure experience, but we suspect that it 
does not play a significant role, at least in our study.  Public defenders in Colorado must have a certain 
amount of misdemeanor and/or juvenile court experience, not to mention a significant amount of training, 
before they are permitted to handle felony cases.  Private counsel, by contrast, are limited only by their 
ability to attract clients.  It is true that many private criminal defense lawyers, especially at the felony level, 
are former prosecutors or public defenders, but it is also true that there are many public defenders in the 
Denver office with decades of felony-level experience.   
14
any study of absolute effectiveness cancel out entirely in a study of relative effectiveness, 
because we can be confident they impact both groups equally.  The problem of 
consecutive versus concurrent sentences is one example.38
Of course, other variables clearly will have impact across the public 
defender/private lawyer boundary.  For example, as we have mentioned, it appears that 
privately retained defense lawyers, on average, handle more serious cases than public 
defenders.39  This variable, however, is easily controlled by econometric methods.40
Our econometric methods have also allowed us to make proper inferences from 
outcome back to plea bargaining.  For example, we know that the differences we 
observed in outcome between public defenders and private lawyers are all happening at 
the plea bargain point or earlier, because those differences are not seen at later stages of 
the process (trial or sentencing).41
Finally, the availability of electronic data made the outcome approach especially 
attractive to us.  In Colorado, the progress of every case at the district court (general 
jurisdiction) level, both civil and criminal, is logged into a state-wide computer system 
called the Integrated Computerized On-Line Network (“ICON”).  ICON contains a wealth 
of information about each case, including, in criminal cases, the name of the defendant, 
the names of counsel, the charges, a log of every motion filed, and minute orders 
38
 See note 51 infra.  
39
 See Figure 3 and the text accompanying notes 66-67 infra.
40
 See Figure 4 and the text accompanying note 70 infra.
41
 See Figures 1 and 2 and the text accompanying notes 64 to 65 infra.
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(meaning the clerk’s summary) of every ruling on every motion, the progress and 
outcome of  the trial, and the sentence imposed.42
The public does not have access to ICON, and because of privacy issues that 
include the statutory confidentiality of certain information in sex assault cases,43 the 
economist-authors of this article (and their graduate assistants) were not allowed direct 
access to the ICON database.  Instead, personnel at the state court administrator’s office 
developed programs to dump categories of non-confidential data into spreadsheets, and 
the econometrics were performed on those spreadsheets.
Unfortunately, ICON does not contain all the information that is contained in the 
case files themselves, including, for example, the type of procedural motions.  Moreover, 
in the process of extracting the data from ICON, certain ICON information could not be 
preserved, including details about when one lawyer might have withdrawn and another 
enter, whether a particular motion was filed by the prosecution or the defense, and 
whether the sentences imposed in the case of multiple convictions were imposed 
concurrently or consecutively.  All of this lost or otherwise unavailable information 
required us to make certain assumptions, and the nature and statistical impact of each of 
those assumptions is discussed below in the section addressed to the variable impacted by 
42
 The inputs into ICON are not completely standardized, especially across judicial districts.  Even within a 
single judicial district, there are some variations in the input practices of individual clerks.  One example, 
quite pertinent to our study, is that clerks in Denver differ greatly in how they describe motions.  Often, the 
entry will simply say “motion,” sometimes even without indicating whether it was a prosecution or defense 
motion.  This difficulty is discussed in more detail in the text accompanying notes 56 to 60 infra.
43
 Colorado’s Open Records Act preserves, and preserved in 2002, the confidentiality of the names of 
victims of sex assault or alleged sex assault, and directs, and directed in 2002, that the custodian of records 
delete that information from the public record.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-304(4) (2004).  Nevertheless, 
the judge-author of this article, and his staff, had access not only to all the ICON data for every case but 
also to the individual case files themselves.
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that assumption.  When a particular assumption seemed particularly critical, we took the 
step of confirming the assumption by examining a sample number of actual case files.44
B.  The Three Variables
The extracted data represented every felony case filed in Denver, Colorado, in 
calendar year 2002.45  Using that data, we measured and then analyzed the relationship  
between three variables: 1) whether defense counsel was a public defender, a privately 
retained lawyer, or a court-appointed private lawyer; 2) defense counsel’s effectiveness, 
measured by the actual sentence outcome; and 3) the number of motions filed by defense 
counsel.
1.  Type of Defense Lawyer
We sorted all defense lawyers into three categories: public defender, 
private lawyer or court-appointed lawyer.  The last category consists of private lawyers 
appointed by the court to represent indigent felony defendants whom the public defender 
cannot represent because of a conflict. We decided to look at the court-appointed 
category, as other studies have, as a check on our effectiveness results from the other two 
categories, with the idea that court-appointed counsel are a kind of cross between public 
defenders and privately-retained defense counsel.  They have private practices and are 
44
 We made two primary assumptions in this study: 1) all sentences were consecutive; and 2) the total 
number of motions filed was a reasonable relative measure of the number of defense motions filed.  We are 
confident the first assumption, which we know is incorrect, had no impact on relative effectiveness.  See 
text note 51 infra.  We tested the second assumption by sampling individual case files.  See text 
accompanying note 60 infra.  
45
 Colorado is a so-called “information state,” that is, felony charges may be brought either by the District 
Attorney filing a complaint and information or by grand jury indictment, issued by a local or the statewide 
grand jury.  COLO. CRIM. P. 2 and 3 (felony complaints) and 6 to 6.9 (grand juries).   We did not distinguish 
between cases brought directly by the District Attorney and cases brought by grand jury indictment.   
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therefore subject to market forces similar to private counsel, but in their appointed cases 
they are paid substantially below market rates and thus face some of the same economic 
disincentives as public defenders.46 Contrary to our guesses, and as depicted below,47
court-appointed lawyers achieved results that were indistinguishable from private 
counsel, and thus substantially better than public defenders.48
In cases where a public defender withdrew and was replaced by a private lawyer, 
or vice versa, we could not tell which lawyer was responsible for the outcome because 
the extracted data merely listed all defense counsel of record sequentially, without 
preserving the date when the first lawyer withdrew and another entered his or her 
appearance.49  We therefore excluded from our analysis the 498 cases in which a different 
type of defense counsel substituted for original defense counsel.50
46
 In 2002, court-appointed counsel, called “alternative defense counsel” in Colorado, were paid $45/hr for 
out-of-court time and $55/hr for in-court time, with certain presumptive caps depending on the seriousness 
of the charges.  Chief Justice Directive 04-04, Attachment D(2) (rates effective from Jan. 1, 2001 through 
February 1, 2003), a copy of which is available at the offices of the *** Law Review.
47
 Figure 6 and 7.
48
 Conclusions about the effectiveness of appointed counsel as compared to the effectiveness of public 
defenders might bear on the hotly debated question of privatizing public defender systems.  See, e.g., 
Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting Effective 
Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73 (1993).  But because of the relatively small number of court-appointed cases in our 
study, we are reluctant to put too much weight on these particular findings.  See Figure 1 (only 214 court-
appointed lawyer cases out of total of 3,777).  
49
 See text accompanying notes 43 to 44 supra.
50
 This might explain why our appointed counsel numbers were so low.   It is quite common for public 
defenders to be appointed early on in a case, before a conflict becomes apparent.  By excluding multiple 
defense lawyer cases, we no doubt excluded a great number of court-appointed cases where the court-
appointed lawyer was appointed after the public defender discovered a conflict.
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2.  Effectiveness
We looked at two related measures of defense counsel “effectiveness,” both 
grounded on the actual sentence that a defendant received. For each case, we compared 
the actual sentence a defendant received (in years) to the maximum sentence he or she 
faced (in years), in both measurements presuming consecutive sentences for cases 
involving multiple counts and capping consecutive sentences at 110 years.51  In one 
measure, which we call “absolute sentence reduction,” we simply subtracted the sentence 
received from the sentence faced.  In the other measure, which we call “percentage
sentence reduction,” we divided the absolute sentence reduction by the total sentence 
faced.  We looked at percentage sentence reduction in order to test whether one type of 
lawyer or the other might tend to have more serious cases, and therefore have more room 
for absolute sentence reduction, although, as discussed below, we also examined 
effectiveness after controlling for the seriousness of the original charges.52
Acquittals or dismissals were counted as zero.  Probationary sentences not 
coupled to any jail time were also counted as zero.  Probationary sentences coupled with 
jail time were counted as the jail time.53  Half-way house sentences (in Colorado, called 
“community corrections” sentences) were counted as 120 days of incarceration, because 
51
 We assumed consecutive sentences because the extracted data did not preserve whether the actual 
sentences imposed were consecutive or concurrent.  But because we are examining the relative
effectiveness of public defenders and private counsel, we do not believe this assumption about consecutive 
sentences infects the integrity of our comparisons.  In fact, if private counsel clients are more frequently 
given concurrent sentences than public defender clients (which may very well be the case because of prior 
record, see text accompanying notes 22 to 23 supra), our assumption that all sentences are consecutive is 
actually understating private counsel effectiveness.  We capped consecutive sentences at 110 years, the 
same arbitrary number we used for life sentences.  See text accompanying note 55 infra.  
52
 See Figures 6 and 7. 
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in Colorado the typical protocol is that a community corrections defendant spends 120 
days in residential custody, then moves to non-residential status.54   Life sentences were 
counted as 110 years.55
3.  The Number of Motions Filed
As we have already discussed, the electronic form of the data we examined did 
not preserve the name of the motion, or even whether it was a defense motion or a 
prosecution motion.56 Nor were we able to distinguish pre-trial motions from post-
conviction motions, which explains why our motions data seems high.57 Neither were we 
able to determine, in cases that actually went to motions hearing, whether private lawyers 
spent more time litigating their motions than did public defenders, as Stuntz hypothesizes
53
 We made no distinction between a jail sentence and a prison sentence, and in both cases measured the 
sentence exclusively by its length.
54
 As with jail versus prison, we made no distinction between the 120 days of assumed custody in 
community corrections and 120 days in jail or prison.  We recognize that a large number of defendants who 
receive community corrections fail, often walking away from the programs during the non-residential 
phase, and therefore picking up new escape charges.  We did not consider this reality in treating all 
community corrections sentences as 120 days of incarceration, for the same reason we did not consider the 
fact that many defendants fail on probation.  Instead, our study focuses on defense lawyer effectiveness as 
measured by the initial sentence.  For that same reason, we did not look at reconsidered sentences, 
outcomes on remand after a successful appeal, early release on parole or parole violations. 
55
 In Colorado, first degree murder carries, and carried in 2002, a minimum sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole, and a maximum sentence of death.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-105(1)(A)(I) (2002) 
(now, § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(I) (2004)).  There were no death penalty cases filed in Denver in 2002.  But see 
note 59 infra.  Certain sex offenses carry, and carried as of October 1, 2002, indeterminate sentences, with 
the court imposing a sentence of a certain minimum length to life.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-904 (2004).  
There were 19 such sentences in our data, and we counted those sentences as an arbitrary 25% of the 
difference between the designated minimum and 110 years.     
56
 See text accompanying notes 42 to 44 supra.
57
 Compare Figure 8, which shows that an average of roughly 20 motions were filed per case (but which 
includes all motions of any type, pre- and post-judgment), with our sample discussed in note 60 infra, 
which showed an average of roughly two motions per case (but which was limited to pre-judgment 
motions).  
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overworked prosecutors will assume.58
Thus, to test Stuntz’s assumption that public defenders file fewer potentially time-
consuming motions than private counsel, we simply counted all the motions filed in each 
case.  Although this is not the perfect measure of defense counsel’s motions activity, we 
believe it is a reasonably good one, given that in the ordinary case the range of 
prosecution motions is rather limited, and there is no reason to suspect that prosecutors
file more or less motions depending on whether the defense lawyer is a public defender 
or private.59  Thus, the number of motions filed by the prosecution will tend to cancel out 
from case to case, leaving the total motions filed as a reasonably good relative indicator 
of the number of motions filed by the defense.60
58
 With a 97% plea bargaining rate, such motions hearings are rare, though not quite as rare as trial, since 
some cases settle after the results of the motions hearing.   
59
 We can imagine that a prosecutor might respond to a glut of defense motions by tending to file more 
motions of his or her own, and so by counting the total number of motions we may, in effect, be 
exaggerating any difference between the number of private and public defender motions.  But our sampling 
proved otherwise.  See note 60 infra.  We should also note that in death penalty cases both sides typically 
file motions that often exceed, by an order of magnitude or two, the numbers filed in ordinary cases.  As a 
result, any general study of the numbers of motion filed in criminal cases should probably deal with death 
penalty cases separately.  There were no death penalty cases filed in Denver in 2002, but in Colorado the 
prosecution has 60 days after arraignment to declare for death.  Colo. Crim. P. 32.1(b).  Thus, defense 
lawyers sometimes defend a first degree murder case as if it were going to be a death penalty case, until the 
60 days passes and the prosecutor does not file for death.  The cases we examined may very well have 
included some of these kinds of “presumptive” death penalty cases. 
60 But to give us comfort about this assumption, we also sampled 50 individual case files.  We looked only 
at pre-trial motions, and in our sample 50 cases the prosecution filed motions in only four of them.  In 
particular, there were a total of 93 pre-trial motions filed in our sample of 50 cases, 89 of them by the 
defense.  In addition to excluding post-conviction motions in our sample, we also excluded the motions to 
dismiss counts and motions to amend or add counts filed regularly by the prosecution when, as part of a 
plea bargain, some counts are dismissed and/or added.  In any event, this sampling showed that we can be
quite confident that by counting all motions we are in fact getting an accurate measure of the relative 
number of defense motions. 
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III. RESULTS
A. General Results
Table 1 lists our general data: the number of cases filed, the number of cases with 
outcomes that could be examined, the overall plea bargaining rate, and the distribution of 
defense counsel.
Of the 5,224 felony cases filed in Denver in 2002, we examined outcome data on 
3,777 cases.  The difference represented the multiple defense lawyer cases we excluded,61
cases in which defendants had failed to appear at or before trial and were at large,62 and 
cases that had not yet resolved by the time we examined the data in May 2004.63
The 97.5% plea bargaining rate is somewhat higher than both the federal and state 
national average.64 This high rate was most likely the result of the Denver Drug Court, 
which, like most drug courts, had a disposition rate that was close to 100%.
Tables 2 through 6, which appear in the appendix to this article, summarize the 
statistical detail from our various pair-wise regressions.  All the regression detail is 
available at the offices of the ** Law Review.  
61
 See text accompanying notes 49 to 50 supra. 
62
 As of August 14, 2004, there were 364 cases from 2002 in which defendants were still at large, although 
this number includes post-trial warrants (that is, defendants who absconded either between the verdict and 
the imposition of sentence or absconded post-sentence from probationary or other non-custodial sentences). 
63
 There were 216 unresolved cases, but more than half of these had already been eliminated because they 
had multiple defense counsel.  Cases that were consolidated into other cases would also not have their own 
outcomes.  In addition, there are a few case numbers that are not assigned to individual cases, but instead 
are reserved to represent the statewide grand jury, the Denver grand jury and miscellaneous criminal 
proceedings, including things like extraditions and witness renditions.  There was also one pro se case.     
64
 See note 26 supra.  
22
B.  Distribution by Type of Lawyer: Seriousness as Affecting Distribution; 
Marginally Indigent Defendants
As shown in Table 1, roughly 65% of the cases were handled by public defenders, 
29% by private counsel and 6% by court-appointed counsel.  As shown in Figure 1, this 
general distribution pattern persisted no matter where along the process we looked.  That 
is, the same distribution appeared when we looked at tried cases instead of all cases
(Column 2), meaning that public defenders, private counsel and court-appointed counsel 
go to trial roughly at the same frequency (with private counsel enjoying a somewhat
higher trial rate).
The same pattern appeared when we looked at convictions (Column 3), meaning 
that public defenders, private counsel and court-appointed counsel enjoy the same 
relative success arguing against convictions (with private lawyers enjoying a slightly 
lower conviction rate). Because this data does not exactly tell us that this same rough 
equivalence was enjoyed at trial (since “convictions” include guilty pleas), we ran 
regressions on conviction rates only for cases that went to trial, and in fact public 
defenders and private lawyers perform identically in terms of their conviction rates at 
trial (Figure 2).
And, finally, the same pattern appeared when we looked only at cases in which 
convicted defendants (whether by plea or verdict) were sentenced to some incarceration
(Figure 1, Column 4), meaning that public defenders, private counsel and court-appointed 
counsel enjoy the same success in arguing against incarceration at sentencing (with 
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private counsel enjoying a slightly lower incarceration rate).65
But when we divided the cases based on the seriousness of the charges, a 
surprisingly different pattern of lawyer distribution emerged.  As shown in Figure 3, 
private counsel’s representation shot up from 29% overall to 42% of defendants charged 
with class 1 felonies.66 That share of representation continued to be above the case-wide 
average until class 4 felonies, decreasing rather linearly as the seriousness of the crime 
decreased.67
Thus, it appears that being “indigent” or “non-indigent” is not nearly as binary an 
inquiry as one might imagine.  Significant numbers of criminal defendants (significant 
enough to account for the distribution patterns noted in Figure 3) claim indigency when 
faced with less serious felony charges, but seem to manage to scrape together enough 
money to hire private counsel when the charge is more serious.  This notion of 
“marginally indigent” defendants makes some sense, both as a matter of procedure and as 
a matter of economic theory.
65
 But of course this is true only with respect to whether the defendant was incarcerated.  It does not 
necessarily answer the much more refined question of the amount of incarceration.  We do not actually 
know whether the difference in the amount of sentence we observed between the two groups is entirely
attributable to differences at the moment of the plea bargain; in theory, the difference could be attributable 
to differences in how effective each group was at the sentencing hearing.  But the practice of sentence 
bargaining greatly reduces the impact defense lawyers can have at the sentencing hearing.  In 2002, Judge 
Hoffman was the only judge, of the seven judges on the Denver District Court criminal bench, who did not 
allow sentence bargaining.  Thus, in roughly 6/7 of the plea bargained cases in 2002, the outcome, or some 
range of permissible outcomes, was subsumed in the bargain itself.
66
 Felonies in Colorado are, and were in 2002, divided into six classes, with the most serious being class 1 
(1st degree murder and some kinds of kidnapping, all with a sentence of either death or mandatory life in 
prison without parole) and the least serious being class 6 (e.g., criminal trespass, with a presumptive prison 
sentence of 6 months to 18 months).  COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-105 (2002) (now § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V) 
(2004)).  The bulk of drug convictions, which represent the bulk of all convictions, are at the class 4 and 5 
levels (presumptive prison sentences of 2 to 8 years and one to three years, respectively).   
67
 Note in Figure 3 that at the class six felony level there was a small reversal in this trend that the less 
serious the charged offense the more likely the public defender will be involved.  One explanation of that 
reversal might be that with these lowest-level felonies, misdemeanor offers are fairly routine, are often 
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In Colorado, the chief justice of the state supreme court issues directives 
establishing presumptive levels of indigency for various purposes, including 
representation in criminal cases by the state public defender.68  Public defenders are 
required to obtain financial affidavits from prospective clients, but generally take their 
client’s word and do not attempt to verify the financial information on the affidavit, 
unless certain red flags appear, such as a supposedly indigent defendant being able to 
post a significant bond.  If the financial affidavit shows that a defendant meets the 
presumptive indigency guidelines, the public defender is routinely appointed without 
further inquiry by the judge, either into the accuracy of the financial affidavit or into 
extra-affidavit aspects of a defendant’s finances that might rebut the presumption of 
indigency.  In other words, whether the presumption of indigency will apply is largely in 
the defendant’s hands, and once it attaches it is, for all practical purposes, irrebutable.69
Thus, to a great extent, defendants who may not really be indigent under these standards 
control whether they will be treated as indigent.
The notion that there are criminal defendants who actually make choices about 
whether to rely on the public defender or pay a private lawyer seems perfectly obvious to 
the economist-authors of this article.  Economics is the study of human choice, and all of 
us are constantly barraged with a continuing stream of choices, and therefore tradeoffs.  
Those of us trained in the law might think of indigency as a binary inquiry simply 
made at the first or second appearance in county court, and private lawyers can be engaged for minimal 
amounts to shepherd those misdemeanor pleas.
68
 Those indigency standards are contained in the Chief Justice Directive discussed in note 46 supra.
69
 We do not by these observations necessarily mean to criticize these procedures.  Every public defender 
system faces the difficult challenge of balancing the cost of creating more refined eligibility sieves—both 
in dollars spent and in the risk of violating Gideon—with the benefits of culling non-indigents from the 
system.
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because a binary decision must be made about whether to appoint the public defender in a 
given case.  But of course with some reflection even the least economically inclined of us 
should be able to appreciate that there is a wide range of financial conditions within the 
category of “indigent.”  Some indigent people, and, indeed from our data, a significant 
number, will resort to their own resources (or their friends and family’s resources) to hire 
a private lawyer if the charges are serious enough, and if they believe a private lawyer 
will keep them from the penitentiary.  To an economist, it is no news that, to the extent 
they are able, marginally indigent defendants, just like all people, act in their perceived 
self-interest.70
2.  Effectiveness
Without controlling for the seriousness of the crime, our study found that 
public defenders are substantially less effective than private lawyers, as detailed in 
Figures 4 and 5.  Our regressions show that, all other things being equal, an average 
public defender client spends almost five more years in incarceration than an average
private lawyer client.
But because private lawyers also tend to handle more serious cases, this gross 
measure of effectiveness may overstate private counsel’s effectiveness, since serious 
70
 We recognize there is a tautological aspect to our findings that marginally indigent defendants facing 
serious charges self-select away from the public defender.  They must do so because they believe private 
lawyers are more effective.  However, as discussed in the text accompanying notes 73 to 74 infra, other 
factors that go into the decision of whether to retain private counsel are whether the marginally indigent 
defendant is guilty and whether he or she believes the case is winnable.  We might disagree about whether 
a general preference by felony defendants for private lawyers reflects an accurate assessment of reality or 
simply the recidivist complaints of the two-thirds of criminal defendants who had been represented by the 
public defender previously.  But we should all be able to agree that, to the extent a marginally indigent 
defendant’s guilt is a factor in his or her decision about whether to hire a private lawyer, that is one factor 
about which the defendant has special expertise.  See note 74 infra and accompanying text.
26
cases leave more room to be “effective” by our measure.  So we re-examined the data, 
this time controlling for seriousness.  The results, shown in Figures 6 and 7, were that 
public defenders still performed substantially below the levels achieved by private 
counsel.  The average public defender client spends almost three more years in 
incarceration than the average private lawyer client facing an equally serious charge.
Thus, our results have confirmed Stuntz’s assumption: public defenders are less 
effective than private lawyers.  But why?  Is it because, as Stuntz hypothesized, that 
private lawyers file more procedural motions than public defenders?  We now examine 
this issue. 
3.  The Numbers of Motions Filed
As shown in Figure 8, our study revealed that, after controlling for 
seriousness, public defenders filed marginally more motions than private counsel.
Although the aggregate difference was not great—only about one motion per case—the 
causal difference was statistically significant.  That is, we can be confident that in 
Denver, a public defender, just by being a public defender, is very likely (to a confidence 
level of 95%) to file one or two motions more than his or her private counterpart.
This result was not at all surprising to our judge-author.  As Stuntz himself 
recognized, many procedural motions are easy to file, are relatively easy to investigate 
and relatively easy to litigate.71 In the real world, a whole host of stock motions are filed 
by public defenders in virtually every case as a matter of routine.  Often, these motions 
take very little time to prepare or to litigate. 
71
 See note 28 supra.
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These realities are reflected in judges’ setting practices.  Most of the judges in the 
Denver district court give counsel on both sides only 20 days after the arraignment to file 
motions, and set most motions to be heard in a single afternoon.  Although there are of 
course exceptions, and even predictable exceptions (e.g., sex assault cases with Rule 
404(b), rape shield and/or child hearsay motions), it is the judge-author’s experience that 
the vast majority of all felony motions are in fact litigated in a single afternoon.
Moreover, contrary to Stuntz’s assumption, “procedural” motions are not always 
non-dispositive.  For example, motions to suppress evidence in drug cases are, by their 
very nature, almost always potential case-winners.  If the drug evidence gets suppressed, 
few cases can proceed.  Experienced public defenders don’t need much time to assess 
whether they have an arguable motion to suppress. It is difficult to imagine that any 
overworked prosecutor would really believe that he or she should offer a better deal to a 
private lawyer than a public defender simply because the public defender is less likely 
than the private lawyer to invest the relatively small amount of time needed to file a stock 
suppression motion, then review the discovery to see if the case has a winnable 
suppression issue. If the relative willingness to file then litigate procedural motions 
cannot explain the substantial difference we have detected between public defender and 
private counsel outcomes, what can?  Our discovery of “marginally indigent” defendants 
suggests an answer.
IV. BAD FACTS, NOT JUST OVERWORKED LAWYERS
In seeking to discover hidden forces that drive case outcomes—that is, in 95% of 
the cases, the forces that drive plea bargains—it is sometimes easy to overlook the 
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obvious.  Trials are about truth-finding, and plea bargaining is about lawyers, defendants 
and victims making predictions about truth-finding.  Bad facts will tend to get defendants
convicted quite apart from the skill of their lawyers, or the lack of skill of the prosecutors
(assuming a minimum level of prosecutorial competence).  Conversely, weak facts, 
coupled with the high burden of proof, will tend to result in acquittals, again quite apart 
from the skill of the lawyers (assuming a minimum level of defense competence).  Thus, 
in a system that tries only 5% of all criminal cases, the most important skill for a lawyer 
on either side is the ability to evaluate a case before entering into plea negotiations, not 
the ability to shine at trial.72
We concede that overworked public defenders may have less time, and less 
economic incentive, to evaluate cases accurately.  But our results suggest that even if we 
posit equal skill in case evaluation, public defenders will still be less effective—not 
because they are bad or overworked lawyers, but simply because they attract less 
winnable cases.
 If it is true, as our results suggest, that a large number of criminal defendants are 
“marginally indigent’ (that is, that they have some choice about whether to claim 
indigency or hire a private lawyer), then that decision will not only depend on the 
seriousness of the offense but also on the defendant’s perceived risk of conviction.  Let’s 
consider the two extremes.  If a marginally indigent defendant is charged with first 
degree murder and is innocent, and assuming he believes (rightly or wrongly) that private 
72
 We recognize that trial skills—both yours and the other side’s—are themselves factors that go into the 
plea bargaining decision.  But the point here is that trial skills, like motions skills, are important only at the 
margins.  The best lawyer in the world can only work with the facts as they are.
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lawyers are more effective than public defenders,73 he will have the maximum incentive 
to try to raise funds to hire a private lawyer.  But if that same marginally indigent 
defendant is charged with a misdemeanor offense witnessed by Mother Theresa, he will 
have no incentive to waste his and his friends’ and family’s resources on a private lawyer.  
Thus, and assuming a sufficient number of marginally indigent defendants, public 
defenders will tend, on average, to get less serious and less winnable cases, which is 
exactly what our data show.
Of course, there are many truly indigent defendants, and therefore some innocent 
indigent defendants, who could not hire private counsel no matter how much they believe 
it might be in their best interest.  Also, defendants are not perfect predictors of the 
strength of the prosecution’s case, although, if we assume the system is reasonably 
reliable, and therefore that case outcomes have something to do with factual guilt, 
defendants are usually in the best position of anyone to assess their case since they 
usually know whether or not they are guilty.74
If the status of “indigent”  is really as ambiguous as our data suggests, the choices 
available to defendants could have a lot to do with the measured outcome differences 
between public defenders and private lawyers.  Public defenders are not just overworked 
and underpaid, they may represent clients who, by self-selection, tend to have worse 
cases.
73
 See note 70 supra.
74
 We recognize, of course, not only that various procedural and evidentiary rules can affect the outcome of 
a case quite apart from the factual guilt of a defendant, but also that “factual guilt” is not the entire inquiry 
in a system in which the defendant’s state of mind is half of the definition of the crime.  Significant 
differences in outcome can happen, and happen regularly, depending on the jury’s view (or, more often, 
counsel’s predictions of the jury’s view) of the defendant’s state of mind.  Whether a defendant acted 
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently is very difficult to determine, and therefore very difficult 
to predict, even for the defendant.
30
V. OTHER EXPLANATIONS
There may well be other explanations for our results, besides the proposition that 
public defender clients self-select for guilt.  For example, because our methodology (and
any methodology short of interviewing the bargaining lawyers75) was unable to measure 
the inherent strength of a case, other than to see what comes out of the plea-bargain 
machine, we cannot actually tell whether the outcome difference is happening because of 
differences in the strengths of the cases, or because public defenders are less effective 
plea bargainers.  That is, it may be that, despite our discovery of marginally indigent 
defendants, these outcome differences can be explained by the traditional disadvantages 
of public defenders—being overworked and underpaid—disadvantages expressed 
directly in the plea negotiations.  Although this alternative explanation is possible, it 
seems unlikely, given our effectiveness results across events (Figure 1).  There is no 
apparent reason, other than the Stuntz effect, why public defenders would be just as 
effective as private lawyers at every phase of the process except the plea-bargaining 
phase.
That brings us to another explanation: perhaps the Stuntz effect is operating 
despite our data on the number of motions filed.  After all, the critical difference posited 
by Stuntz is not that prosecutors predict private counsel will file more motions, it is that 
prosecutors predict private lawyers will file more time-consuming motions.  And of 
course our data was unable to measure whether this prediction is accurate.  Our use of the 
sheer numbers of motions as a measure of the amount of time those motions consume is, 
75
 See text accompanying note 63 supra. 
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as we have already discussed, problematical.76 If we were able to discard the motions 
that really pose no threat of consuming significant litigation time, including the boiler-
plate motions that come from public defender brief banks, perhaps private lawyers really 
do file more potentially time-consuming motions than public defenders.  More 
investigation is needed to ferret out not only the number of filed motions, but the number 
of potentially time-consuming motions and, perhaps most importantly, whether private 
lawyers actually spend more time litigating motions than public defenders.  
Even if we can correctly conclude from our data that the Stuntz effect is not 
happening—that is, that overworked prosecutors do not anticipate private lawyers will 
file more time-consuming motions than public defenders—a kind of Stuntz effect might 
still be happening from the prosecutorial side.  Think of two virtually identical cases, in 
which the prosecutor has filed virtually identical motions, one in which the defendant is 
represented by a public defender and the other in which the defendant is represented by 
private counsel.  If the overworked prosecutor believes the private lawyer is more likely 
than the public defender to resist the prosecutor’s motions at a time-consuming hearing, 
he or she will tend to offer the private lawyer a better disposition.  That is, anytime there 
are filed motions, regardless of the source of those motions, and a difference in the 
willingness of defense counsel to take those motions to hearing, that difference could 
drive a difference in plea-bargained outcomes.
As discussed above, however, this syllogism posits assumptions about the real 
world of motions litigation that simply are not accurate, at least in Denver.  Motions 
typically don’t take days to litigate, regardless of who files them, many procedural 
76
 See text accompanying note 58 supra.
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motions are in fact case-ending if won by the defense, and public defenders seem just as 
willing to file and litigate those case-ending motions as private lawyers.77
Perhaps most importantly, even if the Stuntz effect is operating, there is no way to 
tell whether the overworked prosecutor offered the private lawyer the better deal because
of fear of extended motions litigation, or because the private lawyer simply had a better 
case on the merits.  Thus, it is possible that all three effects operate in tandem to drive the 
outcome difference: the Stuntz effect, the traditional disadvantages faced by public 
defenders, and the self-selection-for-guilt phenomenon we posit in this article.  The 
mechanics of our study do not allow us to distinguish completely between these three 
potential causes.
There is another explanation for the outcome difference, one that ends up being a 
traditional kind of criticism of Stuntz’s procedural/substantive approach.  In a system 
where public defenders and prosecutors have 20 times more cases than they can possibly 
try, it is the threat of a time-consuming trial, not the threat of a relatively less time-
consuming motions hearing, that drives plea bargains.  Assuming private lawyers are in a 
position to try more of their cases than public defenders—indeed, private lawyers may 
have an economic incentive to try cases—this ability would give private lawyers a 
tremendous advantage in the plea bargaining process.  And, in fact, most studies have 
found that private lawyers are more likely to take cases to trial than public defenders,78
including ours.79
77
 See text accompanying note 71 supra.
78
 See note 8 supra.  
79
 Figure 2.  
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We also cannot ignore what may be the biggest disadvantage facing public 
defenders, and one we’ve mentioned only in passing: their clients tend to be in custody 
awaiting trial, rather than on bond.  In the end, it is the defendant’s decision whether to 
accept a plea offer, and the prospect of having to spend months in custody awaiting trial 
must have a significant impact on the plea decision, and perhaps even on the plea offers 
made by prosecutors.  The impact on public defenders of having more than their share of 
in-custody defendants is magnified by their tendency to have less serious cases: a 
defendant facing a 90-day sentence if he takes a plea is unlikely to be willing to spend six 
months in custody awaiting trial, especially if he faces four years if convicted.80
Finally, there is one obvious institutional difference between public defenders and 
private lawyers that, to our knowledge,  has not been examined by any researchers: public 
defenders typically have an ongoing relationship with the same set of prosecutors, 
litigating case after case, while the exchange between the private lawyer and the 
prosecutor may be much closer to a one-time encounter.  What outcome effect, if any, 
might this difference in familiarity breed?   We originally planned to develop a 
“familiarity index” between every prosecutor and every defense lawyer, based on the 
number of case encounters between them weighted by recency, and then measure the 
relatedness of outcome to familiarity.  Unfortunately, in the transfer of data from ICON 
to spreadsheet, some of the information necessary to develop such an index was lost.81
80
 As we have discussed in note 22 and the accompanying text, our data did not preserve the defendants’ 
bond status, so we were unable to measure the impact that being in custody might have on sentence 
outcomes. 
81 Although the names of counsel appear in ICON, they do not appear in the extracted data.  We are 
exploring the feasibility of extracting the identity of counsel (by bar registration number), and, short of that, 
manually examining ICON and/or the actual case file in order to be able to measure counsel familiarity.    
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Experimental economists have discovered many situations in which strategies 
developed in the course of a two person game vary significantly depending on whether 
the same players play each other over and over or whether the games are so-called “one-
shot” games.  When the players know each other, or when strangers get to know each 
other by playing each other over and over, trust between the players can have important 
consequences to their observed behaviors.82  The effects, if any, of lawyer familiarity on 
case outcome could be a significant piece of the effectiveness puzzle. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The general problem of public defender ineffectiveness vis-à-vis private counsel 
is a problem that should concern us all.  Our data show that private defense lawyers 
achieve better sentence outcomes than public defenders, and that the difference is 
statistically significant, both in causation and magnitude.  On average, public defender 
clients suffer in excess of three years more incarceration than private defense clients, 
even controlling for the seriousness of the charges.
Whether this difference is the product of sheer under-funding or of inefficiencies 
of the kind embedded in government-run systems, or a combination of both, it should be 
deeply troubling to us all.  To the extent it is the product of the interplay between 
criminal procedure, the plea bargaining system and under-funding, as Stuntz suggests, it 
should be even more troubling.  Procedures designed to protect all defendants should not 
have the effect of hurting indigent defendants.
82
 Biologists and economists have developed so-called “trust games” to investigate this central aspect of 
human exchanges.  See, e.g., R. Luce & H. Raiffa, GAMES AND DECISIONS (1959); Eric Rasmussen, GAMES 
AND INFORMATION (3rd ed. 2001); Margaret E. Slade, Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical 
Test of Tacit Collusion, 35 J. INDUS. ORG. 499 (1987).
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But our study suggests a more benign explanation.  If we assume criminal
defendants are at least as knowledgeable as the academy about the  differences between 
public defenders and private defense lawyers, marginally indigent defendants, with a 
choice of spending resources on private counsel or claiming indigency and using the
services of the public defender, are likely to make that choice depending on the interplay 
of two factors: the seriousness of the charges and the strength of the prosecution’s case.  
Marginally indigent defendants are most likely to spend resources for private lawyers if 
the charges are serious and if they are innocent. Conversely, they are least likely to spend 
resources on a private defense lawyer to defend minor charges for which they are guilty,
or, more precisely, for which they know the risk of conviction is high.   
Thus, the difference in outcome effectiveness we measured between public 
defenders and private lawyers may reflect, at least in part, that public defenders have less 
defensible cases. Before we rush to consider remedies for the difference between public 
defender and private lawyer effectiveness—by increasing public defender budgets, or by 
privatizing public defender systems, or by attempting, in some other fashion to
disentangle the disparate substantive effects the rules of criminal procedure may be 
having—we should attempt to quantify the extent to which this difference may be the 
result of defendants self-selecting for guilt.  
If this phenomenon is a significant part of the reason public defender clients enjoy 
less favorable outcomes than private lawyer clients, the appropriate remedy, if any is 
needed at all, may simply be to tighten the mechanisms by which we determine 
indigency.
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Table 1: General data
Number of cases filed 5,224
Number cases with measurable outcomes 3,777
Plea bargaining rate (percent) 97.5
Percentage of public defenders 65
Percentage of private counsel 29
Percentage of court-appointed counsel   6
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 Table 2: Estimates of the Relationship between the Number of Motions Filed and 
the Types of Defense Attorneys
Dependent Variable is the Number of Motions Filed 
Public Defender 
Indicator
0.29
(0.58)
0.85
(1.73)+
0.91
(1.87)+
0.91
(1.85)+
Court-Appointed 
Counsel Indicator
1.34
(1.31)
1.20
(1.19)
1.30
(1.31)
1.30
(1.31)
Most Serious Felony 
Charge
-2.87
(10.99)*
-2.70
(10.46)*
-2.70
(10.04)*
Trial Case Indicator 15.65
(11.31)*
15.65
(11.31)*
Number of Charges 
Filed Against 
Defendant
-0.02
(0.15)
Constant 21.76
(52.53)*
32.07
(31.36)*
30.97
(30.65)*
31.07
(26.69)*
Adjusted R-squared .0001 .0307 .0622 .0620
F-statistic 0.87 40.83 63.62 50.89
Notes: The dependent variable is the total number of motions filed in each case.  Absolute values of t-
statistics are in parentheses. “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Estimates of the Relationship between Conviction and the Types of Defense 
Attorneys
Dependent Variable is a Conviction Indicator Variable 
Public Defender 
Indicator
0.30
(6.49)*
0.38
(8.06)*
0.38
(8.05)*
0.45
(9.27)*
Court-Appointed 
Counsel Indicator
0.13
(1.37)
0.11
(1.19)
0.11
(1.18)
0.08
(0.79)
Most Serious Felony 
Charge
-0.36
(14.06)*
-0.36
(14.10)*
-0.22
(7.86)*
Trial Case Indicator -0.15
(1.10)
-0.18
(1.28)
Number of Charges 
Filed Against 
Defendant
0.26
(14.05)*
Constant 0.13
(3.44)*
1.44
(14.27)*
1.45
(14.31)*
0.26
(1.96)*
Pseudo R-squared .0086 .0497 .0500 .0971
Chi-squared statistic 42.71 247.56 248.77 483.60
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable for conviction (1=conviction, 0=no conviction).  
Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Estimates of the Relationship between Incarceration and the Types of 
Defense Attorneys
Dependent Variable is an Incarceration Indicator Variable 
Public Defender 
Indicator
0.24
(4.65)*
0.30
(5.71)*
0.30
(5.73)*
0.33
(6.10)*
Court-Appointed 
Counsel Indicator
0.16
(1.60)
0.17
(1.63)
0.17
(1.65)+
0.17
(1.62)
Most Serious Felony 
Charge
-0.25
(9.21)*
-0.25
(9.05)*
-0.21
(7.34)*
Trial Case Indicator 0.27
(1.97)*
0.27
(1.93)+
Number of Charges 
Filed Against 
Defendant
0.05
(4.97)*
Constant -0.89
(20.37)*
-0.005
(0.05)
-0.027
(0.25)
-0.32
(2.63)*
Pseudo R-squared .0053 .0266 .0275 .0335
Chi-squared statistic 21.98 109.38 113.20 137.91
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable for incarceration (1=incarceration, 0=no 
incarceration).  Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. “*” and “+” represent significance at the 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Estimates of the Relationship between the Percentage Reduction in 
Sentence and the Types of Defense Attorneys
Dependent Variable is the Percentage Reduction of the Final Sentence from the 
Maximum Potential Sentence for the Original Charges 
Public Defender 
Indicator
-2.60
(2.07)*
-2.56
(2.02)*
-2.63
(2.09)*
-2.44
(1.94)+
Court-Appointed 
Counsel Indicator
0.66
(0.25)
0.65
(0.25)
0.51
(0.20)
0.42
(0.16)
Most Serious Felony 
Charge
-0.25
(0.37)
-0.49
(0.73)
-0.04
(0.05)
Trial Case Indicator -21.37
(5.96)*
-21.44
(5.98)*
Number of Charges 
Filed Against 
Defendant
0.63
(2.19)*
Constant 94.99
(90.95)*
95.88
(36.61)*
97.37
(37.18)*
94.09
(31.21)*
Adjusted R-squared .0009 .0006 .0097 .0107
F-statistic 2.66 1.82 10.24 9.16
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage reduction in the sentence ([maximum potential sentence 
for original charges – final sentence received] / maximum potential sentence for original charges)*100.  
Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Estimates of the Relationship between the Reduction in Sentence and the 
Types of Defense Attorneys
Dependent Variable is the Difference between the Final Sentence and the 
Maximum Potential Sentence for Original Charges
Public Defender 
Indicator
-4.67
(8.20)*
-2.40
(5.35)*
-2.41
(5.36)*
-1.13
(3.45)*
Court-Appointed 
Counsel Indicator
2.00
(1.61)
1.43
(1.55)
1.42
(1.54)
0.82
(1.22)
Most Serious Felony 
Charge
-11.57
(48.69)*
-11.59
(48.68)*
-8.51
(46.70)*
Trial Case Indicator -1.69
(1.32)
-2.18
(2.32)*
Number of Charges 
Filed Against 
Defendant
4.30
(57.19)*
Constant 18.30
(38.65)*
59.85
(64.32)*
59.97
(64.16)*
37.61
(47.73)*
Adjusted R-squared .0227 .3997 .3998 .6785
F-statistic 44.89 838.94 629.77 1594.49
Notes: The dependent variable is the reduction in the sentence (maximum potential sentence for original 
charges – final sentence received).  Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. “*” and “+” represent 
significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Counsel Types Across Events
Public Defenders, Private Attorneys, and Court-Appointed Counsel in All Cases, 
Cases Going to Trial, Cases Resulting in Conviction, and Cases Resulting in Incarceration
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Figure 2: Plea Rates and Post-Trial Conviction Rates
Probability of a Guilty Plea and a Trial Conviction for Private Attorneys and Public Defenders 
after Controlling for Most Serious Felony Charge
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Figure 3: Distribution of Counsel Types by Seriousness of Charges
Private Attorneys, Public Defenders, and Court-Appointed Counsel 
in Categories of Felony-Level Cases 
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Figure 4: Absolute Effectiveness
Average Reduction in Sentence for Private Attorneys, Public Defenders, and Court-Appointed 
Counsel
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Figure 5: Percentage Effectiveness 
Percentage Reduction in Sentence for Private Attorneys, Public Defenders, and Court-
Appointed Counsel
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Figure 6: Absolute Effectiveness after Controlling for Seriousness of Charges
Average Reduction in Sentence for Private Attorneys, Public Defenders, and Court-Appointed 
Counsel after Controlling for Most Serious Felony Charge
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Figure 7: Percentage Effectiveness after Controlling for Seriousness of Charges
Percentage Reduction in Sentence for Private Attorneys, Public Defenders, and Court-
Appointed Counsel after Controlling for Most Serious Felony Charge
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Figure 8: Numbers of Motions Filed
Number of Motions Filed in Cases with Private Attorneys, Public Defenders, and Court-
Appointed Counsel after Controlling for Most Serious Felony Charge
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